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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE EXTENT TO WHICH APFIDAVITS OF JURORS WILL BE CON-
SIDERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTING ASIDE THEIR OWN VERDICT.
The question as to what extent and under what circumstances the
affidavits of jurors will be considered on a motion for a new
trial, arises in instances where the losing party feels that the jury
has failed to properly exercise its function of deciding the case m
an impartial and unprejudiced manner according to the law and
evidence submitted in the case. In an early case the arbitrary rule
was laid down that under no circumstances would an affidavit
of a juror be considered for the purpose of setting aside the juror's
sworn act incorporated in the verdict.' The rule thus laid down,
that a "juror will not be permitted to impeach his own verdict,"
was followed by the courts in many jurisdictions and, in the absence
of statutory provision, a majority of the jurisdictions in the United
States will not, under any circumstances, consider the affidavits
of jurors for the purpose of setting aside their verdict. The reasons
for this inflexible rule are based on obvious considerations of
public policy
Vaise v. Delaval, T. R. 11 (1785).
NOTES AND COMMENT
However, some courts have not seen fit to thus arbitrarily
exclude such affidavits, but have under certain circumstances and
conditions admitted them where it is obvious from the facts recited
therein that the parties' rights have been trifled with and that
public policy will best be served by reviewing the matter.
The first case to attempt to lay down any rule as to when such
affidavits are, and when they are not, admissible, is the case of
Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Telephone and Telegraph Co.,2 wherein the
court said.
" * * * affidavits of jurors may be received for the pur-
pose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring
during the trial or in the jury room which does not essen-
tially adhere in the verdict itself, as that a juror was n-
properly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney,
that witnesses or others conversed as to facts or merits of
the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors, that
the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or
by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper
manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may
not be received to show any matter which does essen-
tially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not
assent to the verdict, that he misunderstood the instruc-
ions of the court, the statements of the witnesses or the
pleadings in the case, that he was unduly influenced
by the statements or otherwise of his fellow jurors, or mis-
taken in his calculations or judgment, or other matter rest-
ing alone in the juror's breast."
The Supreme Court of Washington saw fit to follow the more
liberal rule thus pronounced and in the case of State v. Parker3 the
court quoted with approval decisions in the states of Kansas, Ten-
nessee, Iowa and Texas. In that case and in the case of Marvin v.
Yates,4 decided shortly thereafter, the court laid down the rule
that affidavits of misconduct will not be received as to matters
which inhere in the verdict but that affidavits will be received as
to matters which do not inhere in the verdict. Since the decision in
the case of State v. Parker, supra, with the exception of those in-
stances coming within a statutory exception to be mentioned later,
the admissibility of the affidavits has been determined on whether
or not the matters recited in the affidavit inhere in the verdict.5
This test of inherency in the verdict is not altogether satisfactory,
220 Iowa 195 (1866).
25 Wash. 405, 65 Pac. 776 (1901)
'26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131 (1901).
6Wagoner v. Warn, 88 Wash. 688, 153 Pac. 1072 (1915) Hosher v.
Olymrpia Shingle Co., 128 Wash. 152, 222 Pac. 466 (1924) State V. Gunns,
136 Wash. 495, 240 Pac. 678 (1925) State v. McMullen, 142 Wash. 7, 252
Pac. 108 (1927).
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it leaves something to be desired in the way of an accurate test. The
word itself means nothing. It is not descriptive of any class of
facts or circumstances. The Supreme Court of Washington, in a
recent case, has recognized the difficulty of determining the ques-
tion by this test,6 and the courts of other jurisdictions have criti-
cized it as illogical.7 It would be useless to attempt to harmonize
the decisions in the various jurisdictions. It is not the purpose of
this article to criticize the rule, but rather the purpose is to elab-
orate on the expression and attempt to show what is meant by the
rule as laid down in the decisions of this state and of other states
where the rule prevails.
The case in Washington in which the court has gone the farthest
in specifically defining the word is State v. Lorenzy,8 wherein the
court says, "It would seem, then, that the natural way to express
the definition of the word as here applied would be to say that it
means lost in, or covered by the verdict. Verdicts are rendered
upon evidence received in open court, and the true test would be
whether the misconduct complained of fell within, or pertained
to, the legitimate issues of the case, so that the verdict might have
been influenced by it." In State v. Parker9 it was said, "In con-
sidering the affidavits filed, we entirely discard those portions
which may tend to impeach the verdict of the jurors, and con-
sider only those facts stated in relation to misconduct of the juror,
and which in no way inhere in the verdict itself." The definition
attempted by the Iowa court is laid down i Wright v. Ill. & Miss.
Tel. Co.10 Courts in other jurisdictions have used various explan-
atory expressions. The Nebraska court in Harms v. State-" said,
"affidavits of jurors will not be received for the purpose of im-
peaching or avoiding their verdict in respect to a matter which
essentially inheres in the verdict itself, as that the juror was mis-
taken in a computation, or misunderstood a witness, or did not
comprehend the instructions of the court. The reason for the rule
is that the matters referred to being alone within the breast of each
juror, it would be impossible to rebut any statements which might
be made by the juror." The Oklahoma court in defining what does
not inhere in the verdict uses the expression, "An overt act, open to
the knowledge of all the jury and not alone within the personal
consciousness of one."" From these and similar expressions can be
seen the difficulty of laying down any precise definition embody-
mg an accurate classification. And generally courts recognizing
the difficulty, have avoided an attempt to lay down general prin-
ciples. Rather they have adopted the policy wherein each juris-
'Lyberg v. Holtz, 145 Wash. 316, 259 Pac. 1087 (1927).
Hinkel v. Oregon Chair Co., 80 Ore. 404, 156 Pac. 438, 157 Pac. 789
(1916).
159 Wash. 308, 109 Pac. 1064 (1910).
9 See note 3, supra.
10 See note 2, supra.
24 Neb. 803, 40 N. W 317 (1888).
"Carter State Bank v. Ross, (Okla.) 152 Pac. 1113 (1915).
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diction has developed a body of precedents of its own depending
on the existence of an analogous state of facts.
Although the question has frequently been presented to the
supreme court of this state on appeal, in only a few instances has
the court held the affidavits admissible. A careful examination
of the Washington cases indicates that the court has been reluctant
to extend the class of affidavits admissible. The most common
situation which arises and one which would include practically
all the Washington cases permitting the affidavits of jurors is
where evidence or statements, other than those properly received
in evidence, concerning material issues of the case have come
to the attention of the jury Cases of this type include instances
where some juror has made statements of Ins own knowledge as to
facts which, upon reasonable deduction, have a bearing on the
material issues of the case.18 In such instances affidavits of jurors
as to the making and content of the statements have been ad-
mitted. However, that part which attempts to state the effect of
the statement on the juror has not been considered. 14 Another fa-
miliar instance coming within the above class of cases wherein the
affidavits of jurors have been considered is where the juror has
visited the scene of the accident or transaction without leave of
court. 5 Again where the jury by means of microscope discovered
what they considered additional evidence, the affidavits of jurors
were admitted to prove this fact.'16 They are matters open to the
knowledge of the jurors. They relate to overt acts which are
capable of being corroborated or disproved by other jurors. They
do not attempt to show something within the juror's own mind.
They are not facts which impeach or belie the sworn act and word
of the juror, but are facts showing what transpired in the presence
of the jury In Marvsn v. Yates, 17 the court, in discussing the
admissibility of affidavits, says: "Only facts which relate to the
acts of jurors or to influences brought to bear upon them outside
of the evidence can be considered in this conection." Such are
matters which do not inhere in the verdict. It is for the court
then to determine whether the facts recited materially affected a
proper determination of the case.
It may be well at this time to mention a class of cases covered
by the statute. Rem. Comp. Stat. see. 399 (2) provides that,
"whenever any one or more of the jurors shall have been induced
to assent to any general or special verdict to a finding on any ques-
tion or questions submitted to the jury by the court, other and
"State v. Parker, note 3, supra, State v. Lorenzy, 59 Wash. 308, 109
Pac. 1064 (1910).
"Marvnu v. Yates, note 4, supra, State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 103
Pac. 420 (1909).
21 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Seattle Electric Co., 75 Wash. 430, 134 Pae.
1097 (1913).
'State v. Burke, 124 Wash. 632, 215 Pac. 31 (1923).
', See note 4, supra.
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different conclusions, and arrived at by a resort to the determin-
ation of chance or lot, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavits of one or more of the jurors." About the only question
which has been litigated in connection with this statute is whether
or not a quotient verdict, that is, a verdict arrived at by adding
together the various amounts recommended by each of the jurors
and then dividing by the number of jurors, is a verdict arrived at
by lot or chance. In deciding this question the court has laid
down a rule that a quotient verdict will not be set aside as
arrived at by lot or chance, unless it is shown that the jurors agreed
in advance to return the result as their verdict and that they in
fact did so. 8
Outside of these two classes of cases. first, where evidence or
statements, other than those properly received in evidence, con-
cerning material issues of the case have come to the attention of
the jury, second, where the jury has arrived at its verdict by a
resort to lot or chance, the court has generally refused to permit
the affidavits of jurors to be considered on the ground that the
matters recited therein inhere in the verdict.
Thus it has been held that the matter inheres in the verdict and
the affidavits are not admissible where the affidavit states that
jurors misunderstood the instructions of the court,1 9 or that they
misunderstood the testimony of a witness, 20 or that they gave their
verdict on issues other than those upon which they were directed to
by the court.2' Nor will they be considered where the affidavits
state that the affiant consented thereto because of arguments of
fellow jurors, 22 or under the belief that the defendant would be
just as well off under a verdict of guilty with recommendation of
mercy,28 or where he misunderstood the penalty, 2  or where he con-
sented to the verdict because he was ill and wished to be relieved
from duty 25
Prom these cases where the affidavits have been rejected on
the ground that the matter inheres in the verdict a general con-
elusion may be drawn to the effect that, if the matter related to
facts dealing with the juror's thoughts, beliefs, understanding, or
processes of reasoning, they are matters which inhere in the ver-
dict, that is, the juror cannot now say what it was that induced
him to agree to the verdict, or that he had a belief contrary to
his sworn statement incorporated in the verdict, nor can he show
what facts he considered or processes of reasoning he indulged in,
in arriving at the verdict. These are facts within the consciousness
C8 onover v. Neher-Ross Go., 38 Wash. 172, 80 Pac. 281 (195) Wiles
v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 66 Wash. 337, 119 Pac. 810 (1911).
" State 'v. Whzpple, 124 Wash. 578, 215 Pac. 14 (1923).
'0Henslin v. Pratt, 119 Wash. 443, 205 Pac. 867 (1922).
Ralton v. Sherwood. Logging Co., 54 Wash. 254, 103 Pac. 28 (1909).
=State v. Aker 54 Wash. 342, 103 Pac. 420 (1909).
21 State v'. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 144 Pac. 711 (1914)
2 "State v. Holmes, 12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735, 41 Pac. 887 (1895).
2 Lzndqusst v. Pac. Coast Coal Co., 86 Wash. 408, 150 Pac. 619 (1915).
State v. Cook, 126 Wash. 81, 217 Pac. 42 (1923).
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of the juror's own mind, and, if they purport to state something
different or contrary to the belief or judgment expressed in his
verdict, they will not be considered. The juror by submitting such
an affidavit is impeaching himself. He says that he violated his
sworn duty and word in arriving at and giving forth the verdict
he pronounced. Such is the true meaning of the expression "that
a juror shall not be permitted to impeach his own verdict."
ALBERT OLSEN.
INCOMPATIBILITY Op PARTIs AS GROUND FOR DrvORE--This
brief note is concerned with two recent decisions in the State of
Washington touching the law of divorce, Shaw v. Shaw,1 decided
August 22, 1928, by Department One, and Halter v. Haler,2 de-
cided October 8, 1928, by Department Two.
The facts of both cases turn upon incompatibility or the inability
of the parties to live together. In the Shaw case the court holds that
since the enactment of the Session Laws of 1921, p. 331,3 this is
no longer ground for divorce in this state. In the Haller case the
other department of the court apparently holds that it is a ground
for divorce. The Shaw case points out that the present law of
divorce is predicated upon the element of fault of the delinquent
spouse and that the divorce is granted upon the application of the
"injured" party
Upon principle it is difficult to distinguish between the basic
facts of these two cases. They were both cases of an unfortunate
alliance. In both cases there was no "fault" of either party, suffi-
cient as the court intimates to constitute any one of the statutory
grounds for divorce. In the Shaw case the wife became insane,
which was not a fault. In the Haller case the husband drifted into
the more subdued years, so that, as the court says, the very great
divergence of their ages prevented this man and woman from deriv-
ing an appreciable amount of happiness from their marriage, and
for a long period of time they had not lived together as husband
and wife, although occupying the same home. And the court fur-
ther referred to the "difficulty of attempting to mate 'January'
and 'May,' "and substantially bases its decision upon the following
paragraph of the opinion.
"An examination of the record discloses that it is not
only impossible for these parties to live together as hus-
band and wife, but that it is to their interest and the inter-
est of society that they be divorced."
If the rule stated in the Shaw case is correct, requiring fault of
one or both of the parties in some one or more of the causes stated
1148 Wash. 622, 269 Pac. 804 (1928).
149 Wash. Dec. 153, 270 Pac. 822 (1928).
3 Rem. Comp. Stat., sec. 982.
